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Abstract Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that lending to small countries can-
not be supported merely on the country’s “reputation for repayment” if ex-
clusion from future credit markets is the only consequence of default. Their
arguments are valid under fairly general conditions but they do not go through
when the output of the sovereign may vanish along a path of successive low
productivity shocks, or when it may grow unboundedly along a path of suc-
cessive high productivity shocks. We propose an alternative proof illustrating
that their renowned sovereign debt paradox holds in full generality.
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1 Introduction
To understand sovereign risk, it is necessary to understand borrowers’ repay-
ment incentives, or, equivalently, to understand why investors lend to sovereign
countries. Since the legal enforcements in the case of sovereign debt are rather
weak, repayment incentives should rely on a self-enforcing mechanism. The
most obvious mechanism is the loss of reputation that may trigger a ban from
future trading in international capital markets. But does this threat deter a
country from defaulting?
The early studies in the sovereign debt literature (the classic reference is
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)) give an affirmative answer to this question in
settings where the loss of reputation induces a permanent reversion to au-
tarky (that is, the defaulting country is denied access to capital markets and
looses any ability to smooth its expenditures). Bulow and Rogoff (1989) ar-
gue that given the recent developments in international capital markets (free
entry), it is more realistic to assume that a defaulting country can, to some
extend, smooth its expenditures by trading contracts that involve no credit
(consumption-insurance contracts). Building on this insight, they provide a
celebrated critique to the reputational mechanism by showing that exclusion
from borrowing is too weak to sustain any debt repayment.1
The key assumptions that underpin the rationale of Bulow and Rogoff
(1989)’s result are as follows: (1) the sovereign trades at the initial period
contingent contracts that specify the net transfers to foreign investors in all
future periods and events, (2) interest rates are higher than growth rates, in
the sense that the prices of contingent contracts are such that the present value
of the country’s future net income is finite, and (3) upon default, the sovereign
can purchase any consumption-insurance contract by paying cash in advance.2
In this setting, the only traded contracts are those compatible with repayment
incentives. Therefore, in addition to the investors’ break-even condition (or
equivalently, the standard Arrow–Debreu present value budget constraint),
borrowers face participation constraints requiring that the continuation utility
obtained by staying on the contract should be at least as high as that which can
be obtained by defaulting and investing in consumption-insurance contracts.3
The proof of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) is very elegant and powerful. The
key insight is that the debt levels associated to a budget feasible consumption
contract are bounded by the natural debt limits defined as the present value
1 Bulow and Rogoff (1989) led to a vast literature studying alternative mechanisms to
answer why countries repay their debts in the absence of sanctions. It includes, among
others, Cole and Kehoe (1995), Cole and Kehoe (1998), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Dutta
and Kapur (2002), Kehoe and Perri (2002), Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), Krueger and Uhlig
(2006), Amador (2012), and Popov (2014). We refer to Wright (2011) and Aguiar and
Amador (2014) for a thorough discussion of this literature.
2 A “cash-in-advance” contract is just a conventional insurance contract under which a
country makes a payment up front in return for a state-contingent, non-negative future
payment.
3 In that respect the environment in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) is closely related to the one
analyzed in Kehoe and Levine (1993) but with a different default option.
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of future net income. When interest rates are sufficiently high, natural debt
limits are well-defined and satisfy the following roll-over property: the natural
debt limit at some event is larger that the present value of the natural debt
limits at all immediate successor events. This roll-over property together with
the access to all consumption-insurance contracts upon default induce strong
default incentives that are not compatible with the participation constraints.
Indeed, when the ratio of debt to natural debt limit attains its maximum, the
sovereign can default and implement a replication strategy using consumption-
insurance contracts which improves–at any contingency in which endowment
is positive–upon the consumption plan that is subject to debt repayment. This
“arbitrage” argument does not require any restriction on preferences except
strict monotonicity. But, for the replication policy to be budget feasible, it is
essential that–for any contingent contract satisfying the break even condition–
the process of sovereign’s debt to natural debt limit ratio attains its maximum
in finite time. This turns out to be true, for instance, when the sovereign’s net
income is uniformly bounded from above and away from zero.
The first contribution of this paper is to provide examples to support the
claim that, under the general assumptions Bulow and Rogoff (1989) impose
on primitives, there are some contingent contracts for which the maximum ex-
pansion of debt relative to natural debt limits is not achieved in finite time. We
show that this may happen in some plausible scenarios where the net income
of the sovereign vanishes along a path of successive low productivity shocks
(even if the probability of this path is zero), or when it grows unboundedly
along a path of successive high productivity shocks. For these examples, the
proof proposed by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) does not go through.
Recently, Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) provide an alternative proof of Bu-
low and Rogoff (1989)’s unsustainable debt result.4 Their argument does not
require any restriction on the net income process but it makes use of a charac-
terization result of self-enforcing debt limits that requires additional assump-
tions on preferences. In particular, preferences are assumed to be additively
separable and the Bernoulli function to be strictly concave, differentiable and
bounded.
The second contribution of this paper amounts to show that the result
in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) holds in full generality, free of any assumption
imposed on the net income process or on preferences (apart from strict mono-
tonicity).5 We also show that, if preferences are dynamically consistent, its se-
quentially complete markets analogue proved in Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009)
follows as a direct corollary of Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s original result.
4 Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) analyze a slightly different (but equivalent) environment
where agents trade sequentially a complete set of contingent bonds with self-enforcing debt
limits in place of participation constraints. It is the same environment as in Alvarez and
Jermann (2000) but with a different default option. In addition, they show that the risk-
neutrality assumption and the ad-hoc separation between a small open economy and in-
vestors with “deep pockets” play no role for the impossibility result of Bulow and Rogoff
(1989).
5 Similarly to Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) we do not require investors to be risk-neutral.
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Our proof shares some similarities with the one proposed in Bulow and Ro-
goff (1989). We also show for any budget feasible contingent contract involving
some liabilities, there always exists an event at which the sovereign can default
and initiate a replication strategy based on consumption-insurance contracts
that improves upon the consumption plan that is subject to debt repayment.
However, our approach differentiates from Bulow and Rogoff (1989) in two
aspects: the date the country has incentives to default and the replication
strategy that is implemented.
The layout of the paper is as follows. To get a more precise idea of the
differences between our approach and the one proposed in Bulow and Rogoff
(1989), we study in Section 2 a simple environment where the sovereign faces
risk neutral foreign investors and there is no uncertainty. Section 3 describes
the general environment. Section 4 presents the result in Bulow and Rogoff
(1989) and shows the limitations of their approach. Our main result is proven
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a discussion on related issues.
2 A simple environment: No uncertainty and risk-neutral investors
Assume that the price (in terms of time-0 consumption) of a contract delivering
one unit of the good at period t is (1 + r)−t where r is the world interest rate.
Let y = (yt)t>0 be the country’s net income and denote by c = (ct)t>0 the
consumption sequence implemented by a contingent contract. Consider the
sequence of the associated debt levels D = (Dt)t>0 where Dt is defined as the
date-t present value of future net transfers zs := ys − cs for every s > t. If
the interest rate is higher than the country’s growth rates then the natural
debt limit Nt, defined as the present value of future net income, is finite.
Budget feasibility then implies that Dt is lower than Nt.
6 The key issue and
what differentiates our approach from Bulow and Rogoff (1989) is the way we
identify the date at which the country has incentives to default.
2.1 The approach in Bulow and Rogoff (1989)
We let κ be the supremum (over all dates t) of the debt to natural debt limit
ratio Dt/Nt. If we assume that the contingent contract involves some positive
level of debt at some date, then we must have κ > 0. Bulow and Rogoff (1989)
show that the sovereign has incentives to default (i.e., the contract violates
the participation constraint) at any date s satisfying Ds > κ(Ns − ys).7 To
understand why, first observe that the present value (1 + r)−1κNs+1 is lower
than the current debt Ds. This is true since Ns − ys = (1 + r)−1Ns+1. This
in turn implies that, instead of complying with the terms of the contract by
making the net transfer Ds − (1 + r)−1Ds+1 to foreign investors, the country
6 Formally, we have (1+r)−tDt :=
∑
s>t(1+r)
−szs and (1+r)−tNt :=
∑
s>t(1+r)
−sys.
7 The problem is that such a date s may not exist under the general conditions Bulow
and Rogoff (1989) impose on primitives. See Section 4 for details.
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can default at date s, consume c˜s := cs + Ds − (1 + r)−1κNs+1 and save the
difference θs := (1 + r)
−1[κNs+1 − Ds+1].8 The definition of κ implies that
θs > 0. At date s + 1, the return (1 + r)θs = κNs+1 − Ds+1 on previous
savings allows to implement the consumption c˜s+1 := cs+1 + κys+1 and save
the amount θs+1 := (1 + r)
−1[κNs+2 − Ds+2]. Similarly, the definition of
κ implies θs+1 > 0. Recursively, we can show that, at any date s + t, the
return κNs+t − Ds+t on previous savings allows to implement consumption
c˜s+t := cs+t + κys+t and save the amount (1 + r)
−1[κNs+t+1 −Ds+t+1]. This
means that the consumption (c˜s+t)t>0 after date s can be implemented only
through savings. Since c˜s+t > cs+t for every t > 0 with a strict inequality for
some t, this contradicts the participation constraint at date s and the sovereign
has incentives to default on the terms of the contract.
2.2 Our approach
It is useful to first recall the concept of exact roll-over introduced by Hellwig
and Lorenzoni (2009): a sequence (Mt)t>0 is said to satisfy exact roll-over if
the time-0 discounted value (1 + r)−tMt is constant, or equivalently, if Mt =
(1 + r)−1Mt+1 for any t > 0.
We show that it is possible to find a positive sequence M = (Mt)t>0
satisfying exact roll-over, and a date τ such that Dτ > Mτ and Dt 6 Mt for
every t > τ . Once we have identified the sequence M and the date τ satisfying
the above conditions, it is straightforward to see that the country prefers to
default at date τ . Indeed, instead of paying Dτ − (1 + r)−1Dτ+1 to foreign
investors, the country can save Mτ−(1+r)−1Dτ+1 >Mτ−(1+r)−1Mτ+1 = 0
and consume, in addition to cτ , the difference Dτ −Mτ . At date τ + 1, the
return (1 + r)Mτ − Dτ+1 = Mτ+1 − Dτ+1 allows the country to implement
the consumption cτ+1 and save the difference Mτ+1 − (1 + r)−1Dτ+2 = (1 +
r)−1[Mτ+2 − Dτ+2] > 0. Recursively, we can show that for any t > τ , the
country implements the consumption ct using the return Mt −Dt of previous
savings and saving Mt − (1 + r)−1Dt+1 = (1 + r)−1[Mt+1 −Dt+1] > 0. This
implies that the country is strictly better off defaulting at date τ since it
can enjoy the extra consumption Dτ −Mτ at that date without decreasing
consumption at all subsequent periods. The existence of the exact roll-over
sequence (Mt)t>0 and of a date τ satisfying Dτ > Mτ and Dt 6Mt for every
t > τ , follows from the property that the time-0 present value (1 + r)−tNt of
the natural debt limit converges by assumption to zero. The formal details are
presented in Section 5.
3 The general model
We consider a country whose government makes investment and consump-
tion decisions over an infinite horizon. There is one good that can be either
8 Recall that ys = cs +Ds − (1 + r)−1Ds+1.
6 V. F. Martins-da-Rocha and Y. Vailakis
consumed in the same period, or invested as capital for the next period. The
production technology is subject to random shocks. We use an event tree Σ to
describe time, uncertainty and the revelation of information over the infinite
horizon (time and uncertainty are both discrete).
3.1 Uncertainty
There is a unique initial date-0 event s0 ∈ Σ and for each date t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}
there is a finite set St ⊂ Σ of date-t events st. Each st has a unique predecessor
σ(st) in St−1 and a finite number of successors st+1 ∈ St+1 for which σ(st+1) =
st. We use the notation st+1  st to specify that st+1 is a successor of st.
Event st+τ is said to follow event st, also denoted st+τ  st, if σ(τ)(st+τ ) = st.
The set St+τ (st) := {st+τ ∈ St+τ : st+τ  st} denotes the collection of all
date-(t+τ) events following st. Abusing notation, we let St(st) := {st}. The
subtree of all events starting from st is then
Σ(st) :=
⋃
τ>0
St+τ (st).
We use the notation sτ  st when sτ  st or sτ = st. In particular, we have
Σ(st) = {sτ ∈ Σ : sτ  st}.
3.2 Consumption and preferences
If k(st) > 0 is the investment on capital at date-t event st, then the country’s
production at every successor event st+1  st is denoted by f(st+1, k(st)). We
do not impose any restriction on the production function f(st, ·). A standard
example is the neoclassical production technology f(st, k) = A(st)kα+(1−δ)k
where uncertainty only affects the total factor productivity A(st).
We denote by y = (y(st))st∈Σ the net income (or endowment) process
derived from the capital investment k = (k(st))st∈Σ and defined by
y(st) := f(st, k(st−1))− k(st)
where k(s0) > 0 is exogenously fixed. We follow Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and
assume that current investment in capital is deduced from current production.
Assumption 3.1. For every event st, we have y(st) > 0.
The country can finance investment and consumption by trading a state
contingent contract z = (z(st))st∈Σ where z(st) specifies the net transfer from
the country to foreign investors. Negative z(st) indicates a payment from in-
vestors to the country. The consumption process c > 0 associated to the con-
tract z is then given by
c(st) := f(st, k(st−1))− k(st)− z(st) or, equivalently, c := y − z.
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At any event st, the country’s preference relation over consumption c is defined
by a “contingent utility function” U(c|st). Following Bulow and Rogoff (1989)
we only restrict preference relations to be strictly increasing.
Assumption 3.2. For every event st, the function c 7→ U(c|st) is strictly
increasing with respect to the consumption c(sτ ) at any successor event sτ 
st.
Remark 3.1. The above assumption is very general. It allows to encompass
preference relations that are not necessarily additively separable. In particular,
it holds true when preferences satisfy the general recursive functional form
U(c|st) = W
(
c(st),Mst
[(
U(c|st+1))
st+1st
])
where the intertemporal aggregator W : R2 → R is strictly increasing and the
event st certainty equivalent Mst((U(c|st+1))st+1st) of future continuation
utility U(c|st+1) is also strictly increasing. If preference relations are additively
separable, in the sense that
U(c|st) = u(c(st)) +
∑
τ>1
βτ
∑
st+τst
pi(st+τ |st)u(c(st+τ ))
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and pi(st+τ |st) is the conditional proba-
bility of st+τ given st, then Assumption 3.2 is satisfied if the Bernoulli function
u is strictly increasing. Observe that we do not need to assume that u is con-
cave, differentiable or bounded.
3.3 Markets
We denote by q(st+1) the price, in terms of event st consumption, of the st+1-
contingent bond. Given bond prices q = (q(st))sts0 we denote by p(st) the
associated date-0 price of consumption at st defined recursively by p(s0) = 1
and p(st) = q(st)p(σ(st)) for every st  s0. We use PV(x|st) to denote the
present value at date-t event st of a process x restricted to the subtree Σ(st)
and defined by
PV(x|st) := 1
p(st)
∑
st+τ∈Σ(st)
p(st+τ )x(st+τ ).
Following Bulow and Rogoff (1989), we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.3. The present value of the country’s future net income is
finite, i.e., PV(y|s0) <∞.
Remark 3.2. We could assume, as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989), that foreign
investors are risk-neutral. In this case,
q(st+1) =
1
1 + r
pi(st+1|st)
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where r would be the world interest rate and pi(st+1|st) the conditional proba-
bility of st+1 given st. However, the risk-neutrality assumption and the ad-hoc
separation between a small open economy and investors with “deep pockets”
play no role in Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s analysis. The mechanism underlying
their unsustainable debt result is valid even if we consider a general equilibrium
version of their model where all agents are treated symmetrically (implying
that lenders and borrowers are determined endogenously).
Foreign investors are willing to provide any state-contingent claim z if they
break-even in present value terms, i.e.,9
PV(z|s0) > 0. (3.1)
Given that the country’s future net income has finite present value, the break-
even condition (3.1) is equivalent to the standard Arrow–Debreu present value
budget constraint PV(c|s0) 6 PV(y|s0). In particular, we have the equivalent
sequential formulation: for every st  s0,
c(st) +
∑
st+1st
q(st+1)a(st+1) = y(st) + a(st) (3.2)
where a(st+1) := PV(c − y|st+1) is the country’s holding of the bond issued
at event st and contingent to the successor event st+1.10
Since consumption is non-negative, the bond holding process satisfies the
natural debt limit constraint, i.e,
a(st) > −N(st) where N(st) := PV(y|st).
Observe that the country’s outstanding debt D(st) := PV(z|st) at event st
satisfies D(st) = −a(st). In particular, the debt D(st) does not exceed the
value of a claim to the country’s entire future net income stream, i.e., D(st) 6
N(st).
3.4 Self-enforcing contracts
A state-contingent contract z involves debt repayment if PV(z|st) > 0 for
some event st. The country keeps the promises associated to contract z if, and
only if, for every event st, the continuation utility U(c|st) associated to the
consumption c = y−z is not lower than the maximum utility V (st) the country
would get by defaulting. Following Bulow and Rogoff (1989) we assume that
after default, the country is excluded from borrowing but keeps the ability
to save by investing in a complete set of one-period contingent bonds.11 This
9 Observe that this condition restricts feasible contracts z to be such that the series
PV(z|s0) is well-defined.
10 The term a(s0) can be interpreted as an initial transfer.
11 This is equivalent to assuming that the sovereign has access to any consumption-
insurance contract. Formally, at any event sτ after default, the country can make the pay-
ment
∑
sτ+1sτ q(s
τ+1)a˜(sτ+1) up front in return for any state-contingent, non-negative
future payment a˜(sτ+1) > 0.
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implies that the value V (st) of the default option is the largest continuation
utility U(c˜|st) where c˜ is financed by a process a˜ of non-negative bond holdings,
i.e.,
∀sτ  st, c˜(sτ ) +
∑
sτ+1sτ
q(sτ+1)a˜(sτ+1) 6 y(sτ ) + a˜(sτ ) (3.3)
where a˜(st) = 0 and a˜(sτ ) > 0 for every strict successor sτ  st. A contract z
is said to be self-enforcing if the incentive compatibility constraint
U(c|st) > V (st) (3.4)
is satisfied for every event st ∈ Σ.
4 Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s result
Consider a contract z satisfying the break-even condition (3.1). Bulow and
Rogoff (1989) propose to show that if z involves positive levels of debt, i.e.,
PV(z|sτ ) > 0 for some event sτ in Σ, then it cannot satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraints (3.4).
To state formally their claim, we need to introduce the following notation.
Let κ(z) ∈ [0, 1] be the lowest number satisfying PV(z|st) 6 κ(z) PV(y|st) for
every st. Such a number exists since z 6 y (consumption c is non-negative)
and the present value of net income is finite (which implies that PV(z|st) 6
PV(y|st) for every event st).
Proposition 4.1 (Bulow and Rogoff (1989), Theorem 1). Consider a con-
tract z satisfying the break-even condition (3.1). Assume that the following
condition is satisfied
∃st ∈ Σ, PV(z|st) > κ(z)[PV(y|st)− y(st)]. (BR)
If the contract z involves some positive level of debt, then it cannot be self-
enforcing (i.e., it must violate the incentive compatibility constraint (3.4)).
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) assume implicitly that condition (BR) is satis-
fied. Eaton and Fernandez (1995) claim that this condition follows from the
definition of κ(z). Observe that an alternative definition of κ(z) is
κ(z) := sup
st∈Σ
κ(z|st)
where κ(z|st) ∈ [0, 1] is defined by the equation PV(z|st) = κ(z|st) PV(y|st).12
If the supremum in the definition of κ(z) is attained at some event st where the
net income y(st) is strictly positive, then condition (BR) is satisfied (with a
strict inequality). There are also other conditions under which (BR) is satisfied.
12 If PV(y|st) = 0, we pose κ(z|st) = 0.
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Proposition 4.2. Assume that foreign investors are risk-neutral, i.e., p(st) =
γtpi(st) where pi(st) is the unconditional probability of event st and γ = (1 +
r)−1 where r > 0 is the risk-free interest rate. Assume moreover that there
exist yh > yl > 0 such that y(s
t) ∈ [yl, yh] for any event st. Then, for any
contract z satisfying the break-even condition (3.1), condition (BR) is satisfied.
Proof. For any st ∈ Σ we have
y(st) > yl > ε
yh
1− γ > εPV(y|s
t)
where ε := (1− γ)yl/yh. This implies that
∀st ∈ Σ, κ(z)[PV(y|st)− y(st)] 6 κ(z)[1− ε] PV(y|st).
Therefore, there must exist some event st such that PV(z|st) > κ(z)[PV(y|st)−
y(st)]. Otherwise, we get that PV(z|st) 6 κ(z)[1 − ε] PV(y|st) for all st ∈ Σ,
which contradicts the definition of κ(z). Q.E.D
If the net income process is not bounded away from zero, or, it is unbounded
from above, then a contract that satisfies the break-even condition does not
necessarily satisfy condition (BR). To prove our claim, we first provide an
example of an economy for which the net income process may vanish along a
path of successive negative shocks.
Example 4.1. At every date t, a shock st ∈ {`, h} realizes. The initial event is
s0 = ` and a date-t event st is a history of shocks, st = (s1, . . . , st). A following
event st+1  st can be written as st+1 = (st, st+1) with st+1 ∈ {`, h}. The net
income process of the country is defined by
y(s0) := yl and y(s
t, st+1) :=
{
yh if st+1 = h
αy(st) if st+1 = `
where α ∈ (0, 1) and yh > yl > 0. The conditional probability pi(st+1|st) is
defined as follows:
pi(st+1|st) =
{
1 if (st, st+1) = (h, h)
pil if (st, st+1) = (`, `).
After a good shock st = h at date t, the country’s endowment switches to its
high level yh and remains high forever. After a bad shock st = `, the country’s
endowment is reduced by a fraction α. A good shock can be interpreted as
innovation that allows to sustain a high productivity level.
Foreign investors are risk-neutral. That is, at every event st, we have
p(st) = γtpi(st) where γ = (1 + r)−1 and the risk-free interest rate r is posi-
tive. The price of the bond contingent to next-period shock st+1 is given by
q(st+1) = pi(st+1|st)/(1 + r).
We denote by `t the history of successive negative shocks (`, `, . . . , `) up to
date t. Consider the process λ = (λ(st))st∈Σ where λ(st) = 0 if st 6= `t and
On the sovereign debt paradox 11
λ(`t) = κt ∈ (0, 1) where (κt)t∈N is an increasing sequence of positive numbers
satisfying limt→∞ κt = 1. Given the process λ, we can construct a contract z
satisfying13
PV(z|st) = λ(st) PV(y|st). (4.1)
Observe that κ(z|st) = λ(st). This implies that
κ(z) = lim
t→∞κ(z|`
t) = lim
t→∞κt = 1
and κ(z|st) < κ(z) for every event st. In particular, the supremum κ(z) is not
attained in finite time.
Proposition 4.3. For the economy considered in Example 4.1, the contingent
contract z defined by Equation (4.1) does not satisfy condition (BR), i.e.,
∀st ∈ Σ, PV(z|st) < κ(z)[PV(y|st)− y(st)].
Proof. Given that PV(z|st) = λ(st) PV(y|st) and κ(z) = 1, we have to show
that
∀st ∈ Σ, λ(st)y(st) < [1− λ(st)]
∑
st+1st
q(st+1) PV(y|st+1). (4.2)
This is obvious if st 6= `t since λ(st) = 0. To show that Equation (4.2) is valid
for st = `t, observe that∑
st+1st
q(st+1) PV(y|st+1) > γ(1− pil) PV(y|(`t, h)) = γ(1− pil) yh
1− γ .
Moreover, λ(`t) = κt and y(`
t) = αtyl. Therefore, Equation (4.2) is satisfied
if
∀t > 0, αtyl < 1− κt
κt
γ(1− pil) yh
1− γ . (4.3)
It is always possible to choose the sequence (κt)t∈N such that Equation (4.3) is
satisfied. Take for instance κt = µ/(α
t+µ) where µ < [γ(1−pil)yh]/[(1−γ)yl].
Q.E.D
In Example 4.1, we have exploited the fact that the process of net income
is not uniformly bounded away from zero to show that a contingent contract
that satisfies the break-even condition (3.1) does not necessarily satisfy con-
dition (BR). As suggested in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) (Footnote 5), we can
replace the process y by a larger process y? > y that also has finite present
value (i.e., PV(y?|st) <∞). Consider the special case where foreign investors
are risk-neutral. Given the result of Proposition 4.2, it sounds reasonable to
let y?(st) := y(st) + 1. We get a process that is bounded away from zero.
However, if foreign investors are not risk-neutral, it is not clear how the pro-
cess y could be increased to some y? such that any contingent contract z
13 We can choose z(st) := λ(st) PV(y|st) −∑st+1st λ(st+1)q(st+1) PV(y|st+1). Since
λ(st+1) > λ(st), we have that z(st) 6 y(st).
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that satisfies the break-even condition (3.1) would also satisfy condition (BR).
More importantly, the process y may still be unbounded from above. We show
next that, even if the process of net income is uniformly bounded away from
zero, a contract that satisfies the break-even condition (3.1) may not satisfy
condition (BR).
Proposition 4.4. Consider the same economy as in Example 4.1 except that
the net income process is now defined as follows:
y(st, st+1) :=
{
(1 + g)t if st+1 = h
1 if st+1 = `
where g ∈ (0, r). The contract z defined by Equation (4.1) does not satisfy
condition (BR), i.e.,
∀st ∈ Σ, PV(z|st) < κ(z)[PV(y|st)− y(st)].
Proof. It suffices to show that Equation (4.2) is valid for st = `t. Observe that
∑
st+1st
q(st+1) PV(y|st+1) > γ(1− pil) PV(y|(`t, h)) > γ(1− pil) (1 + g)
t+1
1− χ
where χ := (1+g)/(1+ r) < 1. Moreover, λ(`t) = κt and y(`
t) = 1. Therefore,
Equation (4.2) is satisfied if
∀t > 0, κt < (1− κt)γ(1− pil) (1 + g)
t+1
1− χ . (4.4)
It is always possible to choose the sequence (κt)t∈N such that Equation (4.4)
is satisfied. Take for instance κt = µ/((1 + g)
−t + µ) where µ < γ(1− pil)(1 +
g)/(1− χ). Q.E.D
5 The general result
The main contribution of this paper is to show that condition (BR) is super-
fluous for the validity of the result stated in Bulow and Rogoff (1989).
Theorem 5.1. Consider a contract z satisfying the break-even condition (3.1).
If the contract z involves some positive level of debt, i.e., PV(z|st) > 0 for some
event st, then there exists a successor event sτ  st for which the incentive
compatibility constraint U(c|sτ ) > V (sτ ) is not satisfied.
Before we proceed to prove the general result, we find it useful to illustrate
how our approach applies to the deterministic case.
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Proof for the deterministic case. Assume that the country’s net income is de-
terministic. We then replace the notation st by t. In particular, the country’s
net income is now a sequence (yt)t>0. Fix a contract z = (zt)t>0 that satisfies
the break-even condition (3.1) and denote by D = (Dt)t>0 the associated se-
quence of debt levels defined by Dt := PV(z|t). The consumption c := y − z
can be financed by trading sequentially one period contingent bonds. This is
because we have
∀t > 0, ct − qt+1Dt+1 = yt −Dt. (5.1)
It is important to notice that Dt 6 Nt where Nt is the natural debt limit
defined by Nt := PV(y|t).
Assume there exists a date ξ > 0 such that Dξ > 0. Since the country’s
future net income is assumed to be finite, we have limt→∞ ptNt = 0. This
implies that there exists a sufficiently large time period η > ξ such that pξDξ >
pηNη. Let τ be the largest time period in {ξ, . . . , η} satisfying
pτDτ > pηNη. (5.2)
We claim that
∀t > τ, ptDt 6 pηNη. (5.3)
If t ∈ {τ + 1, . . . , η}, this follows from the definition of τ . If t > η, this follows
from the following inequalities14
ptDt 6 ptNt 6 pηNη.
Adding pηNη on both sides of the flow constraints (5.1) for any t > τ , we get
pτ cτ + pτDτ − pηNη︸ ︷︷ ︸
pτδ
+pηNη − pτ+1Dτ+1 = pτyτ
and for every t > τ
ptct + pηNη − pt+1Dt+1 = ptyt + pηNη − ptDt.
If we let (a˜t)t>τ be defined by
pta˜t := pηNη − ptDt
then we get that
cτ + δ + qτ+1a˜τ+1 = yτ
and for every t > τ
ct + qt+1a˜t+1 = yt + a˜t.
The inequality (5.2) implies that δ > 0. The inequality (5.3) implies that
a˜t > 0 for every t > τ . It follows that if the sovereign defaults at date τ , he
succeeds to finance the consumption sequence (cτ + δ, cτ+1, . . .) by a sequence
of non-negative bond holdings (a˜)t>τ . This means that V (τ) > U(c|τ) and z
cannot be incentive compatible. Q.E.D
14 Recall that pt−1Nt−1 = pt−1yt−1 + ptNt > ptNt.
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Remark 5.1. Eaton and Fernandez (1995) propose a different proof for the
deterministic case. They show that the sovereign has incentives to default
at the date s for which the debt is maximum. To ensure that the sequence
(Dt)t>0 admits a maximum, they assume that the sequence (PV(y|t))t>0 is
bounded.15 This is stronger that the assumption imposed by Bulow and Rogoff
(1989) who only assume that the value PV(y|t) of future net income discounted
to any time t is finite. Indeed, assume that there is growth, say yt = (1 + g)
t
where g < r. Since interest rates are higher than growth rates, we get that
PV(y|t) = (1+g)t/(1−χ) where χ := (1+g)/(1+r). The assumption of Bulow
and Rogoff (1989) is then satisfied but we do have limt→∞ PV(y|t) =∞.
We now provide the details of the proof for the general environment where
net income is stochastic.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let z be a contract that satisfies the break-even con-
dition (3.1). We let D(st) := PV(z|st) for each date-t event st ∈ Σ. Since
z = y − c where the consumption process c is non-negative, we deduce that
D(st) 6 N(st) where N(st) := PV(y|st) is the natural debt limit.
Fix an arbitrary date η ∈ N and let Mη = (Mη(st))st∈Σ be a process
satisfying the following properties.
(i) The process Mη satisfies exact roll-over in the sense that
∀st ∈ Σ, Mη(st) =
∑
st+1st
q(st+1)Mη(st+1). (ER)
(ii) For every date-η event sη ∈ Sη, we have Mη(sη) = N(sη).
(iii) For every t > η and every event st ∈ St, we have Mη(st) > N(st).
Remark 5.2. Such a process always exists. Indeed, first pose Mη(sη) := N(sη)
for every date-η event sη. Second, the exact roll-over condition (ER) defines
in a unique way the process Mη(st) at every event st with t < η. Third, we
know that N(sη) >
∑
sη+1sη q(s
η+1)N(sη+1). This implies that we can find
ε(sη+1) > 0 such that N(sη) =
∑
sη+1sη q(s
η+1)[N(sη+1) + ε(sη+1)]. We can
then let Mη(sη+1) := N(sη+1)+ε(sη+1) for each sη+1 ∈ Sη+1. Since N(sη+1)+
ε(sη+1) >
∑
sη+2sη+1 q(s
η+2)N(sη+2), we can find ε(sη+2) > 0 satisfying the
condition: N(sη+1) + ε(sη+1) =
∑
sη+2sη+1 q(s
η+2)[N(sη+2) + ε(sη+2)]. We
can then let Mη(sη+2) := N(sη+2)+ε(sη+2). Proceeding by induction, we can
define Mη(st) at every node st where t > η such that (i) and (iii) are satisfied.
Assume that there exists a date-ξ event sξ such that D(sξ) > 0. Exact
roll-over of M t implies that for every t > ξ we have16
p(sξ)M t(sξ) =
∑
st∈St(sξ)
p(st)N(st).
15 Since Dt 6 Nt := PV(y|t), if the sequence (PV(y|t))t>0 is bounded, then the sequence
(Dt)t>0 is bounded from above and admits a least upper bound.
16 Recall that St(sξ) is the set of all possible date-t events following sξ.
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Since the present value of the country’s future net income is finite, we have
lim
t→∞ p(s
ξ)M t(sξ) = lim
t→∞
∑
st∈St(sξ)
p(st)N(st) = 0.
Therefore, the set {
t ∈ N : t > ξ and D(sξ) > M t(sξ)}
must be non-empty. Let us denote by η the smallest element of the above set.
We do have D(sξ) > Mη(sξ).
Claim 5.1. There exists a date τ 6 η and an event στ  sξ such that
(a) D(στ ) > Mη(στ );
(b) for every st  στ , we have D(st) 6Mη(st).
Proof. Let T be the set of dates defined by
T := {t ∈ {ξ, . . . , η} : ∃st ∈ St(sξ), D(st) > Mη(st)} .
This set is non-empty since it contains ξ. Let τ be the largest element of T
and στ be any element of Sτ (sξ) such that D(στ ) > Mη(στ ). Property (a) is
trivially satisfied. We prove now property (b). Fix an arbitrary st  στ . If t ∈
{τ +1, . . . , η}, then by the definition of date τ , we must have D(st) 6Mη(st).
If t > η, then D(st) 6 N(st) 6Mη(st) by property (iii). Q.E.D
We claim that the sovereign has incentives to default at the event στ .
Indeed, if the sovereign honors the contract z, then the associated consumption
process c := y − z has to satisfy the following flow constraints
∀st  στ , c(st)−
∑
st+1st
q(st+1)D(st+1) 6 y(st)−D(st).
Suppose that, instead of fulfilling its promises, the sovereign chooses to default
at event στ . The sovereign can then increase its consumption by D(στ ) −
Mη(στ ) > 0 at event στ and opt for the asset holding a˜(st) := Mη(st) −
D(st) > 0 at all successors st  στ . Letting c˜(στ ) := c(στ ) +D(στ )−Mη(στ )
and recalling that Mη satisfies exact roll-over, we have
c˜(στ ) +
∑
sτ+1στ
q(sτ+1)a˜(sτ+1) 6 y(στ ).
That is, the sovereign can enjoy higher (due to property (a)) consumption at
the event στ . Posing c˜(st) = c(st) for every strict successor st  στ , we also
have that
∀st  στ , c˜(st) +
∑
st+1st
q(st+1)a˜(st+1) 6 y(st) + a˜(st).
That is, the sovereign can support through savings (due to property (b) and the
fact that Mη satisfies exact roll-over) the consumption c˜(st) = c(st) specified
by the contract z at all successor events st  στ . It follows that
V (στ ) > U(c˜|στ ) > U(c|στ )
and the incentive compatibility constraint is not satisfied at στ . Q.E.D
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6 Discussions
6.1 Capital adjustment after default
In the definition of the default option V (st) we assume that the country does
not modify its investment plan on the out-of-equilibrium path corresponding to
default. This is an ad-hoc restriction. We should replace V (st) by the higher op-
portunity cost W (st) defined as the largest continuation utility U(c˜|st) where
c˜ is financed by a process a˜ of non-negative bond holdings and a process k˜ of
capital investment, i.e., for every event sτ  st,
c˜(sτ ) + k˜(sτ ) +
∑
sτ+1sτ
q(sτ+1)a˜(sτ+1) 6 f(sτ , k˜(sτ−1)) + a˜(sτ ) (6.1)
where k˜(st−1) = k(st−1), a˜(st) = 0 and a˜(sτ ) > 0 for every strict successor
sτ  st.
If a contract z satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints with respect
to W (st) then z also satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints with re-
spect to V (st). Therefore, since debt cannot be sustained when the outside
option is V (st), it can neither be sustained when the outside option is W (st).
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and
Jermann (2000) assume that, after default, the sovereign can neither access
international saving markets, nor modify its investment on capital. This leads
to autarky and the default option is now U(y|st). Such a punishment is se-
vere enough to sustain some level of debt. However, it is hard to justify that
the sovereign cannot modify its investment on capital after default. In the
environment where a defaulting agent is excluded from borrowing and saving,
we should then consider the default option R(st) defined as the largest con-
tinuation utility U(c˜|st) where c˜ is solely financed by a process k˜ of capital
investment, i.e.,
∀sτ  st, c˜(sτ ) + k˜(sτ ) 6 f(sτ , k˜(sτ−1)) (6.2)
where k˜(st−1) = k(st−1). Rosenthal (1991) shows that when productivity is
deterministic and under some additional conditions on the initial capital hold-
ing, debt is never sustained under the default option R(st).
6.2 Negative net income
To simplify the presentation, we assume (as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989)) that
the current investment in capital is deduced from the current production,
i.e., the net income y(st) := f(st, k(st−1)) − k(st) is non-negative. We can
handle the general case where net income can be negative at some events if
we strengthen Assumption 3.3 by requiring that
PV(y+|st) <∞ (6.3)
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where y+(st) := max{y(st), 0} is the positive part of y(st).
To encompass this case it suffices to pose N˜(st) := PV(y+|st) and observe
that D(st) 6 N(st) 6 N˜(st). The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows verbatim
replacing N by N˜ .
Observe that Condition (6.3) is satisfied if gross output (instead of net
income) has finite present value, i.e.,∑
st∈Σ
p(st)f(st, k(st−1)) <∞
where k(s−1) is the given initial capital stock.
6.3 More severe punishment: loss of income
We follow Section III.B in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and analyze debt re-
payment incentives when, in addition to the exclusion from borrowing, the
defaulting country looses a part of its net income.17 Formally, if the country
defaults at event st, we denote by `(sτ ) ∈ [0, y(sτ )] the loss in net income
at every event sτ  st. The default option V (st) is then replaced by V `(st)
defined as the largest continuation utility U(c˜|st) where c˜ is financed by a pro-
cess a˜ of non-negative bond holdings and where net income y(sτ ) is replaced
by y˜(sτ ) := y(sτ )− `(sτ ), i.e.,
∀sτ  st, c˜(sτ ) +
∑
sτ+1sτ
q(sτ+1)a˜(sτ+1) 6 y˜(sτ |st) + a˜(sτ ) (6.4)
where a˜(st) = 0 and a˜(sτ ) > 0 for every strict successor sτ  st.
As in Theorem 2 in Bulow and Rogoff (1989), we get as a direct corollary
of Theorem 5.1 that debt can be sustained when default entails some loss of
net income, but up to a level that does not exceed the present value of the
loss.
Corollary 6.1. Consider a contract z = y − c that satisfies the break-even
condition (3.1). If the debt level at some event st is strictly larger than the
present value of the loss of net income, i.e.,
PV(z|st) > PV(`|st)
then there exists a successor event sτ  st for which the incentive compatibility
constraint U(c|sτ ) > V `(sτ ) is not satisfied.
17 We also refer to Cole and Kehoe (2000), Dutta and Kapur (2002), Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006), Arellano (2008), Bai and Zhang (2010), and Mendoza and Yue (2012) for models
where default induces a loss in net income in addition to the exclusion from borrowing.
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Proof. Consider a contract z satisfying the break-even condition (3.1) and
denote by c := y− z the associated consumption process. Assume there exists
an event st  s0 such that PV(z|st) > PV(`|st). Let z˜ be the contract defined
on the subtree Σ(st) by z˜(sτ ) := z(sτ )− `(sτ ) for every sτ  st. Observe that
z˜ = y˜ − c on the subtree Σ(st) and PV(z˜|st) > 0. We can apply Theorem 5.1
to the economy defined on the subtree Σ(st) with net income y˜ and conclude
that there exists some event sτ  st such that the corresponding participation
constraints U(c|sτ ) > V `(sτ ) is violated. Q.E.D
6.4 Self-enforcing and not-too-tight debt limits
We have argued that the environment in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) can be seen
as the analogue of Kehoe and Levine (1993) (i.e., constrained Arrow–Debreu
contingent markets) but with a different default punishment.18 Alvarez and
Jermann (2000) study a sequential formulation of Kehoe and Levine (1993).
Instead of assuming that agents can trade any contingent contract at the
initial date, they consider an environment where agents trade sequentially a
complete set of one period contingent bonds (Arrow securities). In this setting,
the Arrow–Debreu present value constraint is replaced by a sequence of flow
constraints, while the participation constraints are replaced by agent-specific
debt limits that are compatible with maximal risk sharing subject to debt
repayment being individually rational. Such limits on borrowing are referred
in the literature as not-too-tight (self-enforcing) debt limits.
Formally, a non-negative process A = (A(st))st∈Σ of debt limits is said to
be not-too-tight when
∀st ∈ Σ, J(A,−A(st)|st) = V (st)
where, given an initial financial claim b at event st, the value J(A, b|st) is the
largest continuation utility U(c|st) where c is financed by a process a of bond
holdings satisfying
∀sτ  st, c(sτ ) +
∑
sτ+1sτ
q(sτ+1)a(sτ+1) 6 y(sτ ) + a(sτ ) (6.5)
with
a(st) = b and a(sτ ) > −A(sτ ), for every sτ  st. (6.6)
Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) (see Proposition 3 in their paper) show that if
A is not-too-tight and bounded from above by the natural debt limits N , then
we must have A = 0. We propose to show that this result can be obtained as
a direct corollary of Theorem 5.1 provided that preferences, apart from being
strictly increasing, are also dynamically consistent.
18 In Bulow and Rogoff (1989) the outside option is V (st) which is larger than the autarchic
outside option U(y|st) of Kehoe and Levine (1993).
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Definition 6.1. Preferences are dynamically consistent if for every event st ∈
Σ, for every consumption processes c and c˜, the following conditions
c˜(st) = c(st) and U(c˜|st+1) > U(c|st+1), ∀st+1  st
with at least one strict inequality for some event st+1, imply that U(c˜|st) >
U(c|st).
Remark 6.1. Assume that preferences satisfy the general recursive functional
form of Remark 3.1 where the intertemporal aggregator W : R2 → R is strictly
increasing and the event st certainty equivalentMst((U(c|st+1))st+1st) of fu-
ture continuation utility U(c|st+1) is strictly increasing. Then, such preferences
are dynamically consistent and strictly increasing.
Proposition 6.1. Suppose that preferences are dynamically consistent and
strictly increasing. If a process A of non-negative and not-too-tight debt limits
is tighter than natural debt limits (i.e., A 6 N), then A(st) = 0 for every
event st ∈ Σ.
Proof. For every event st and initial financial wealth b ∈ R, we denote by
B(A, b|st) the budget set of pairs (c, a) of consumption and bond holdings
satisfying (6.5) and (6.6). The demand set d(A, b|st) is defined to be the set
of optimal pairs in B(A, b|st), i.e., (c, a) ∈ d(A, b|st) if, and only if, (c, a) ∈
B(A, b|st) and U(c|st) = J(A, b|st).
We only prove that A(s0) = 0. The result for an arbitrary event st is ob-
tained replacing the whole tree Σ by the subtree Σ(st). Let (c, a) be an optimal
plan in the demand set d(A,−A(s0)|s0). We first prove that the consumption
process c is self-enforcing. Dynamic consistency of preferences implies that for
every st, the plan (c, a) belongs to the demand set d(A, a(st)|st). Given that
a(st) > −A(st), monotonicity implies that
U(c|st) = J(A, a(st)|st) > J(A,−A(st)|st) = V (st).
Let c˜ be the consumption process defined by c˜(s0) := c(s0)+A(s0) and c˜(st) :=
c(st) for every strict successor st  s0. Observe that c˜ satisfies the incentive
compatibility constraints (3.4). We now prove that it satisfies the break-even
condition (3.1). Summing the present value of the flow budget constraints, we
have for every τ > 1
τ−1∑
t=0
∑
st∈St
p(st)(c(st)− y(st))−
∑
sτ∈Sτ
p(sτ )A(sτ ) 6 −p(s0)A(s0).
Since 0 6 A(sτ ) 6 N(sτ ) we can pass to the limit when τ →∞ to get
PV(c− y|s0) 6 −A(s0), or, equivalently, PV(y − c˜|s0) > 0.
Applying Theorem 5.1 to the contract z˜ := y− c˜, we get that a˜(st) := PV(c˜−
y|st) > 0 for every st  s0. It follows that the pair (c˜, a˜) belongs to the
budget set B(0, 0|s0) implying that V (s0) > U(c˜|s0). By definition of A(s0),
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we have U(c|s0) = J(A,−A(s0)|s0) = V (s0). This implies that U(c|s0) >
U(c˜|s0). Since c˜(s0) = c(s0) +A(s0) and c˜(st) = c(st) for every st  s0, strict
monotonicity implies that we must have A(s0) = 0. Q.E.D
Remark 6.2. In order to prove that A(s0) = 0, we can adapt in a straightfor-
ward manner the above proof to show that the assumption “the debt limits
in A are non-negative and tighter than the natural debt limits” can be re-
placed by: A(s0) > 0 and the process A satisfies the following transversality
condition:
lim
τ→∞
∑
sτ∈Sτ
p(sτ )A(sτ ) = 0.
We make use of this observation in the proof of Proposition 6.2.
We next explore the implications of our analysis to models where the con-
tinuation utility after default at event st is some arbitrary number W (st).
If the default punishment is stronger, in the sense that W (st) 6 V (st), one
expect that some level of self-enforcing debt can be sustained at equilibrium.
The polar example is when W (st) = U(y|st) as in Kehoe and Levine (1993)
or Alvarez and Jermann (2000). Another example is temporary exclusion as
in Azariadis and Kaas (2013).
Using Theorem 5.1, we can show that the maximum level of self-enforcing
debt is unique.
Proposition 6.2. Suppose that preferences are dynamically consistent and
strictly increasing. If A and A′ are two processes of non-negative, not-too-tight
debt limits that are tighter than natural debt limits, then A = A′.
Proof. We only prove that A(s0) = A′(s0). The result for an arbitrary event st
can be obtained replacing the whole tree Σ by the subtree Σ(st). We can
assume without any loss of generality that A(s0) > A′(s0). We let y′ be the
process defined by
y′(st) := y(st)−A′(st) +
∑
st+1st
q(st+1)A′(st+1).
Fix an event st and let (c′, a′) be an optimal plan in the set d(A′,−A′(st)|st).
Since c′(st) > 0, we must have y′(st) > 0. We denote by E ′ the economy where
the income process y is replaced by y′. Observe that the plan (c′, a′ +A′) be-
longs to the set d′(0, 0|st) where d′ is the demand of the economy E ′. In partic-
ular, we have W (st) = V ′(st) where V ′(st) := J ′(0, 0|st) is the Bulow–Rogoff’s
default continuation utility in the economy E ′. It follows from a straightfor-
ward translation invariance of the budget constraints (6.5) and (6.6) that the
process D := A−A′ satisfies
J(A,−A(st)|st) = J ′(D,−D(st)|st), for all st.
Even if D is not necessarily non-negative, the right-hand side of the above
inequality is well-defined. Observe that the above equality means that D is not-
too-tight in the economy E ′. Moreover, D satisfies the conditions of Remark 6.2
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since D(s0) > 0 and |D| 6 2N . We can then apply Proposition 6.1 to get that
D(s0) = 0. Q.E.D
Proposition 6.2 extends Proposition 3 in Bidian and Bejan (2015) in the
same way Proposition 6.1 extends Proposition 3 in Hellwig and Lorenzoni
(2009). Since these results follow from an arbitrage argument, we do not need
to assume that preferences are additively separable with a strictly concave
and differentiable Bernoulli function. We only assume preference relations to
be dynamically consistent and strictly increasing.
7 Conclusion
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) consider a competitive environment where creditors
have no legal recourse in the event of a default. They show that if debtors have
access to a rich set of deposit contracts to put savings abroad rather than re-
paying creditors, then debt cannot be sustained at equilibrium. Their argument
is surprisingly simple and applies under very general assumptions. Formally,
when the ratio of debt to natural debt limit attains it maximum value, the
sovereign is better off not repaying this debt, but rather use the scheduled pay-
ments to buy cash-in-advance contracts as a form of self-insurance. However,
Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s argument may fail unless we impose additional
restrictions on the sovereign’s net income. Indeed, we show, by means of ex-
amples, that if there is a path along which the sovereign’s net income may
vanish or grow unboundedly, then there may exist feasible contracts for which
the ratio of the debt to the natural debt limit does not achieve a maximum
at any contingency, in which case their proof fails. We provide an alternative
proof which restores unconditionally the validity of Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s
no-borrowing result.
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